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The experience with protectionist pressures and protection in the seven indus- 
tries reported on here, along with the cross-section evidence gleaned from In- 
ternational Trade Administration-International  Trade Commission (ITA-ITC) 
cases, suggest a number of hypotheses. 
For economists,  some of  the important  lessons  emerge from conclusions 
regarding the determinants of protection. The Staiger-Wolak findings, the anal- 
ysis of  decisions regarding lumber, the determinants of influence in affecting 
NAFTA, and, indeed, all the other studies point strongly to the influence of 
political strength (generally unrelated  to considerations  of  static or dynamic 
efficiency and even to income distribution arguments often heard) as a major 
determinant of protection. This appears to be so even for the administered pro- 
tection processes, which in theory are governed by legal considerations set out 
in law. 
From the perspective of politicians and policymakers,  this conclusion will 
hardly appear surprising. From the viewpoint of the public interest, however, 
it raises  significant questions  as to the feasibility  of  devising institutions or 
mechanisms  which can differentiate between those seeking protection out of 
narrow  self-interest and those cases in which industrial protection  might be 
warranted because of  the sorts of considerations to which the ‘hew trade the- 
ory” points. For economists concerned with framing policy, therefore, ques- 
tions as to the capacity of the political process to be constrained in ways which 
enable trade policy to respond to broader interests must be addressed. 
Anne 0. Krueger is professor of economics at Stanford University and a research associate of 
the National Bureau of Economic Research. 
I. But the law itself permits the International Trade Commission only to consider factors within 
the industn1 in determining outcomes: from the viewpoint of economic theory. evaluation should 
surely take into account the effects on the American economy as a whole. and not simply on the 
industry receiving protection. 
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In the volume arising out of the project, these and related  issues are dealt 
with at much greater length, Here the focus is on the findings from the individ- 
ual studies relevant for the policy-making community regarding current trade 
policy formulation and practice. 
A starting point must be a brief survey of the salient findings from the indi- 
vidual  studies. Thereafter,  I address the  key  questions they raise for policy 
formulation and execution. 
9.1  Findings from Individual Studies 
9.1.1  Automobiles 
From a policy perspective, perhaps the key findings arising from the auto 
study center on the effects of  protection on the industry. It seems clear that 
voluntary export restraints (VERs) on Japanese automobiles did not achieve 
the results the automakers apparently hoped for: on one hand, the VER was 
largely offset initially by a decline in demand (as a result of the recession), thus 
making the VER ineffective, and later it resulted in higher profits for Japanese 
companies (thus strengthening their competitive position) as well as increased 
imports from other countries. Nelson’s analysis convincingly demonstrates that 
the turnaround for US. automakers was a result of  competition, and not of 
protection per se. 
It should also be noted that VERs were adopted when administration offi- 
cials began to be concerned that congressional pressures would otherwise re- 
sult in an even more protectionist outcome: there were bills pending in Con- 
gress that would have mandated even more restrictive measures governing auto 
imports than the VERs on Japanese automobiles. Thus the fact that VERs were 
employed does not at all prove that the administration was in the forefront of 
those seeking more protection: the administration moved to forestall congres- 
sional action. 
9.1.2  Steel 
Like automobiles, steel appears to have been experiencing economic diffi- 
culties in large part because the earlier high degree of industry concentration 
and world  preeminence  had  left  it  very  comfortable,  unaccustomed  to  re- 
sponding to competitive challenges from other sources of supply. 
There are several other aspects of the experience with steel that are of inter- 
est. First, it is not evident whether the various protectionist measures imposed 
on steel imports did in fact help the domestic industry. Second, a new technol- 
ogy-the  emergence  of  minimills-resulted  in  greatly  reduced  cohesion 
within the industry in seeking protection. Moreover, some steel users became 
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effects of protection are important, and the only instance in the seven studies 
where using  industries became at all significant as opponents of protection. 
Third, when the steel industry was still cohesive in seeking protection, it used 
the administered trade processes, antidumping and countervailing duties, as an 
instrument to induce the executive branch to take action. Finally, the effective- 
ness of a well-organized and cohesive industry effort (for or in the case of steel 
users, against) in lobbying for a desired outcome was certainly important in 
the steel industry. 
9.1.3  Semiconductors 
The semiconductor industry represents another instance where administered 
trade processes were used to induce the American and Japanese governments 
to agree upon a VER rather than permit the administered protection process to 
reach its conclusion. It also represents another instance in which a number of 
questions may be raised as to whether the protection that resulted helped the 
U.S. industry: profits were increased for existing Japanese firms, thus enabling 
them to invest in the next generation of  chips that much  sooner; third-party 
effects were important as Korean firms were attracted into the industry by the 
higher world prices; and Japanese firms located plants within the United States 
to avoid U.S. protection. 
Although the opposition of downstream users of semiconductors proved im- 
portant in  limiting the  extent of  protection,  the  semiconductor  negotiations 
raise significant questions as to the extent to which U.S. trade policy can be 
driven by the interests of one or a few firms. As Douglas Irwin notes, at one 
point, the position of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) was that of  one 
firm  (Micron),  and  the  industry  held  virtual  veto  power  over  negotiated 
agreements. 
9.1.4  Textiles and Apparel 
The very fact that the textiles and apparel industry has been protected since 
the mid-1950s raises questions about the efficacy of  protection as an instru- 
ment to achieve the goals desired by the industry. Employment was declining 
before the industry received protection; when it did receive protection, new 
plants opened in the South but plants in New England closed. One analysis 
suggests that protection accelerated the rate at which the industry relocated to 
the South (Isard 1973). 
The evolution of the protection of the industry also attests to the extent to 
which an instrument, once in place, tends to become more complex over time 
as more and more groups attempt to seize it for their own purposes. Finally, 
J. Michael Finger and Ann Harrison point to the coherence of the industry’s 
organization and lobbying activities: they attribute some of the restrictiveness 
of the Multi-Fibre Arrangement (MFA), as well as its perpetuation, to that ef- 
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9.1.5  Lumber 
As Joseph Kalt demonstrates, Canadian policy toward lumber results in in- 
tramarginal transfers, but economic analysis demonstrates fairly clearly that it 
does not affect exports to the United States. Despite that, the U.S. industry has 
been able to appeal to the administered protection process to achieve protec- 
tion which, in that instance, Kalt judges to be of substantial benefit to the in- 
dustry by raising the United States’ price of lumber. 
In evaluating the arguments that are effective in achieving a ruling favorable 
to the industry seeking protection, Kalt finds that the political influence of the 
participants  is a significant factor in determining the outcome: that is, when 
the potential gains from winning are significant and the group seeking protec- 
tion  is politically  influential,  protection  is more  likely  to follow  from  the 
process. 
9.1.6  Wheat 
The wheat Export Enhancement Program (EEP) subsidizes wheat exports. 
The economic benefits to wheat growers are small relative to the cost of the 
subsidies, and the question is why, in the absence of a strong rationale, these 
subsidies have persisted since their initial introduction. 
Bruce Gardner points to the unity between the farmers and agribusiness as a 
key factor in achieving continuing support for the EEP. Notably, also, domestic 
wheat users have not opposed the program. The fact that EEP supporters are 
well  organized  and  effective  in  their  political  representation  has been  im- 
portant. It is also significant that the program was found to be budget-neutral 
(because of the existence of large government stocks), which enabled Congress 
to support the program without budgetary consequences. 
9.1.7  Agriculture in NAFTA 
Whereas the  EEP affects only  one group of  farmers, negotiations  over 
NAFTA potentially affected many groups. Analysis of the positions of  various 
farm groups and the determinants of the degree to which groups received bene- 
fits under NAFTA is therefore informative as to the relative strength of differ- 
ent groups. 
Perhaps the most significant result to emerge from an analysis of the factors 
influencing the outcome for different agricultural commodities under NAFTA 
is the starting point for David Orden’s analysis: it was predetermined  that, at 
the end of a (fairly long) transition period, all agricultural protection between 
the  United  States and Mexico would  be removed. That  decision,  in an  im- 
portant way, set the agenda and determined  the context in which various ag- 
ricultural groups could attempt to influence the outcome: they could slow down 
the process but not stop it. 
A second significant result of the analysis of the determinants of NAFTA is 
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before  the  NAFTA  accord reached  Congress were able to  extract relatively 
large gains (in terms of their narrowly defined self-interest) in return for their 
support. Sugar producers, for example, did well because of their willingness 
to compromise. 
9.2  Questions for Policymakers 
From the perspective of policy analysis, these findings raise several key is- 
sues. First is the extent to which protection achieves the results its supporters 
hope for, even within their own industries. Second is the extent to which cur- 
rent U.S. trade law and implementation appropriately reflect U.S. interests and, 
related to that. the questions that arise regarding the frequent failure of user 
groups to be represented when policy is formulated. Third. the importance of 
industry unanimity and the absence of opposition from user groups as an im- 
portant determinant of protection raises a number of questions. While “politi- 
cal strength” matters greatly to an industry’s ability to receive protection, that 
strength can rest on factors other than industry size or even the importance to 
the industry of receiving protection. Political  strength can result from being 
strategically positioned  in the middle of  an issue-those  in such a position 
may not be the ones with the most to gain or lose. Fourth, direct winners and 
losers from protection are not all equal in their attempts to influence the pro- 
cess. In that  sense, good lobbying, effective organization,  and the means of 
seeking political representation all matter. Finally, from several of the studies 
it emerges that  once the battle for protection  is initially won, the bamer to 
continued protection is greatly reduced. 
9.2.1  Does Protection Help the Protected Industry? 
There has been protection for textiles and apparcl since the mid- 1950s.  The 
first such measure was termed the “Short-Term.” Despite that, the industry has 
chronically  complained that  protection  is “inadequate” and does not  “help 
enough.” Despite increasing restrictiveness, especially in the late  1980s, pro- 
tests from the industry have not diminished. 
Protection for automobiles (also in the form of voluntary export restraints) 
does not appear to have reversed the fortunes of  the U.S. automobile industry: 
Douglas Nelson concludes that competition was the important stimulant.’ The 
same questions can be raised about the semiconductor agreement (although 
industry representatives appear to believe that they were assisted by the semi- 
conductor agreement). For steel, a technological  change-the  emergence of 
the minimills-scems  to have been important  in affecting the industry: it is 
questionable how much the old integrated mills benefited from VERs on steel 
2. See Schcrer (1992). Scherer notes that firms in general react more “passively” to foreign 
competition when trade barriers are in place and, because of that, have less satisfactory perfor- 
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imports. Even in the case of wheat, Gardner believes that the Export Enhance- 
ment Program arguably did little for wheat growers, and certainly did less than 
their enthusiastic support for the program suggests they believed it would. 
Among the protected industries studied in the NBER project, then, there is 
only one instance in which the author believes that U.S. producers unequivo- 
cally benefited: lumber. In all the others, it cannot be persuasively argued that 
the  protection  accorded  an  industry  was  important  in  turning  its  fortunes 
ar~und.~  This does raise important questions about the efficacy of protectionist 
trade policies, even in assisting the industries that seek protection. To the extent 
that trade barriers give producers false assurances, they may indeed be counter- 
productive from the industry’s perspective in the long run. 
9.2.2  Does Current Trade Law Reflect U.S. Interests? 
There are powerful  grounds for arguing that the  United  States is so im- 
portant in the  international economy  that its  actions significantly  affect the 
actions undertaken by its trading partners.  Certainly other countries have re- 
cently been adopting “unfair trading” laws covering countervailing duties and 
antidumping that are patterned after US.  law.4 
The United States clearly has a systemic interest in an open international 
trading system that by far outweighs the benefits (if any) that can be achieved 
from individual affirmative findings in administered protection cases, the im- 
position of VERs, and other protective measures. Even if protection through 
any of these channels could be shown unequivocally  to benefit the American 
economy, questions could still be raised about the total effect when repercus- 
sions on foreign countries are taken into account. 
Quite aside from that overarching concern, however, there are grounds for 
concern about the impact of protection that are not recognized in political de- 
bates about trade policy and in the criteria used in U.S. trade law for determin- 
ing whether protection is warranted. A first and obvious omission, long noted 
by  economists, is that the interests of final consumers are not represented. In 
political debates, this is no doubt a reflection of the organization costs among 
large numbers of individuals, each of whom has a small amount to gain if a 
particular product’s price is lower. 
However, even more surprising is the fact that under U.S. trade law, the ITC 
is not empowered to take consumer interests into account in its findings with 
respect to administered protection. Moreover, the ITC is not even permitted to 
3. NAFTA is only now going into effect, and therefore the question of the benefits to different 
agricultural groups cannot be addressed. 
4.  There are a number of criticisms that can be made of US.  trade laws, in addition to those 
made here. Chief among them are: (1) the law is administered in ways which provide protection 
even during the period when litigation is proceeding-the  Staiger-Wolak finding; (2) the proce- 
dures for construction of costs, and other aspects of administrative procedures, can result in find- 
ings of “selling below cost” even when the foreign firm is not doing so; and (3) there are circum- 
stances in which foreign firms can be found guilty of practices which, if adopted by  an American 
firm, would be legal. See the essays in Boltuck and Litan (1991). 101  Implications of the Results of Individual Studies 
consider the impact of protection on other American industries, including us- 
ers of  the  product.s Thus, even if economists could convincingly  show that 
the effect of protection on other American industries was quantitatively more 
harmful (because, for example, of a loss of competitiveness vis-A-vis imports) 
than the benefits6 to the prospectively protected industry, that would not consti- 
tute sufficient evidence to reject protection. 
It should be noted that the failure to consider the “general equilibrium” con- 
sequences of  protection is a characteristic of political debates on protection as 
well. Debates over protection  for steel and machine tools come to mind as 
particularly telling examples where the products  are purchased primarily  by 
other producers and increased prices inevitably raise their cost structure. But 
the experience with semiconductors-where  producers of personal computers 
discovered that they would be at a significant disadvantage vis-a-vis their for- 
eign competitors-also  vividly illustrates the point. 
Even when users  are not concentrated  in a few industries,  the effects on 
other industries of raising costs can be significant. Yet  in all these instances, 
the political process treats protection to the industry seeking it as something 
that can be accomplished without harming other sectors of the American econ- 
omy. Not only is protection itself an economic act of discriminating  against 
the many in favor of the few, but the political and administrative criteria used 
for awarding protection are biased in that direction. While it might be the case 
that, for example, society deems that the benefits of protection to apparel ex- 
ceed the costs, a procedure (or rules of political discourse) which at least per- 
mitted these costs to be taken into account would be far preferable to present 
practices. 
9.2.3  There Will Be Protection when the Industry Is Unanimous 
Perhaps the most intriguing finding arising from the studies and from discus- 
sions with policymakers is the reluctance of using industries to oppose protec- 
tion, and the general belief that protection will be granted when the industry is 
unanimous in supporting it.’ 
The most effective defense against protection would appear to be a division 
within the industry. The most vivid example of this among the NBER cases is 
steel, where prospects for protection diminished substantially after the owners 
of minimills opposed it. For semiconductors as well, industry unanimity was 
not achieved prior to the mid-1980s: until that time, the industry’s efforts to 
5. There is the question, of course, as to why users do not oppose the imposition of protection 
on their inputs. As seen in Moore’s analysis of steel, they can so oppose (if the protection sought 
is through VERs, but not if it is through the ITC), but it seems to require a fairly major stake in 
the outcome to induce the necessary organization. 
6.  It is assumed here that the benefits of protection to the protected industry are positive. As 
indicated above, however, even this assumption may be suspect. 
7. This regularity was noted by  several of  the “witnesses” when participants in  the projects 
met  with  policymakers in  Washington, D.C.,  in July  1993. The same point has  been made by 
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obtain protection  had  failed. Evidence  from other sources  and all analysts’ 
accounts point to the same conclusion. 
This raises a number of  interesting, and unanswered,  questions. Why, for 
example, did the auto industry-a  major steel user and itself in difficulty- 
not oppose steel VERs in the early 1980s? Why did it take until the late 1980s 
for producers of  agricultural machinery to finally oppose continued protection 
for steel?  And, to cite another example, why do apparel makers side with textile 
manufacturers  in seeking protection when, as using industries, their interests 
in textile protection would appear to diverge?8 
When policymakers  were queried in this regard at the project meeting in 
Washington, responses generally focused upon a “gentleman’s agreement,” or 
understanding,  that  each  industry  would  not  protest  others’  protection,  but 
rather seek its own (implicitly, unopposed). If such is the case, questions arise 
as to how such tacit understandings came about. If there are not such implicit 
understandings,  the  puzzle  remains as to why  opposition  is not  more fre- 
quently voiced. 
9.2.4  Good Lobbying and Organization Do Matter 
Short-term economic interests generally determine the side on which vari- 
ous interest groups fall in pressuring for or against protection. However, some 
groups are better organized, or more readily organized, than others. The corre- 
lation between the magnitude of economic interests and the effectiveness of 
organized  lobbying efforts does not appear strong. Some groups that might 
benefit from protection  (or its removal) do not appear well organized, while 
others are extremely effective. 
J. Michael Finger and Ann Harrison point to the well-organized efforts of 
the textile and apparel groups as a key factor in their achieving as much protec- 
tion as they in fact receive. Michael Moore’s discussion shows the importance 
of effective organization and lobbying in seeking and maintaining prote~tion.~ 
Protection for the semiconductor industry appears to have been another in- 
stance in which a well-organized  industry group was crucial to the achieve- 
ment of protection. Once there was opposition from users (the personal com- 
puter assemblers, who had to compete with foreign assemblers), the degree to 
which the industry could seek to achieve protection diminished. 
In this regard, however, perhaps the most interesting and telling cases among 
the studies are those concerning agriculture: maneuvering regarding the time- 
table for reduced protection to agriculture under Mexican entry into NAFTA 
8. Here, of  course, a possible  answer might be that the two industries together  form a more 
effective lobby that can achieve more than either could separately, and that the joint gains exceed 
the potential if cach goes it alone. 
9. Thc nceded degree of effectiveness is clearly greater for achieving initial protection than for 
perpetuating  it. Even when  protection is perpetuated, however,  it can be  restrictive  to  varying 
degrees. A more effective lobby will, presumably, achieve greater restrictiveness than a less effec- 
tive one. 103  Implications of the Results of Individual Studies 
was heavily  influenced by  the pressures that different producer groups were 
able to bring to bear. Likewise, the  wheat  growers were able to organize to 
achieve the Export Enhancement Program in ways that other farm groups ap- 
parently were not. 
9.2.5  Past Protection Matters 
The evidence from these studies and elsewhere strongly suggests that the 
existence  of  a protectionist  instrument-VER,  EEP,  sugar quota, or what- 
ever-in  the past  strongly increases the ease with which protection  may be 
obtained today. Stated otherwise, the expected level of protection in the future 
is higher, for the same industry characteristics, (1) if the industry received pro- 
tection in the past and (2) the higher the level of protection was in the past. 
Clearly, each round of MFA negotiations started with the preceeding  level 
as a base: much of the industry’s lobbying efforts were directed to achieving 
heightened protection.  Likewise, Gardner points to the ease with which the 
wheat growers were enabled to achieve a renewal of  the EEP, contrasted with 
the initial barrier to obtaining it. A semiconductor  agreement with Japan in 
1991 was far easier to obtain because there had been one in 1986. The history 
of protection for steel in the 1970s made it easier for the industry to persuade 
the U.S. administration to negotiate again. 
9.3  Interrelationships 
Each of these key findings, which are spelled out in considerably  greater 
detail in the conference volume, has implications for policymakers. They are, 
however,  interrelated  and when  taken  in the aggregate  suggest  that  current 
practices regarding protection may be widely at variance with considerations 
of the public good or economic efficiency. 
Questions  concerning  the efficacy  of  protection  in directly  improving  an 
industry’s fortunes become even more pressing when it is recognized that the 
indirect negative effects are not adequately taken into account. Conversely, the 
economic costs of failing to examine indirect effects of protection loom larger 
if questions arise concerning the sign and magnitude of  direct effects. 
When consideration is further given to the proposition that using industries 
that may be harmed by protection are reluctant to protest, economic efficiency 
may be further diminished when a unanimous industry seeks protection  as a 
perceived means of alleviating its problems. When effective organization and 
political clout are then important in determining outcomes, there is a further 
delinking of economic efficiency from the granting of  protection. 
Add to these considerations concerns as to the “fairness” of the administered 
protection laws, and it seems clear that questions must be asked about the de- 
gree to which current U.S. trade policy achieves objectives that are in the inter- 
est of the American people and economic efficiency. 104  Anne 0.  Krueger 
References 
Boltuck, Richard, and Robert E. Litan, eds. 1991. Down in the dumps: Administration 
Isard, Peter. 1973. Employment impacts of textile imports and investment: A vintage- 
Milner, Helen. 1988. Resisting protectionism: Global industries and the politics of in- 
Scherer, F.  M.  1992. International high-technology competition,  188-89.  Cambridge, 
of the unfair trade laws. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution. 
capital model. American Economic Review 63, no. 3 (June): 402-16. 
ternational trade. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. 
Mass.: Harvard University Press. 